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DEMAND-DRIVEN TECHNICAL CHANGE AND 
PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 
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We present novel evidence on the effect of market size on technology 
adoption and productivity. Our tests exploit a natural experiment in 
the U.S. corn industry where changes to national energy policy created 
exogenous increases in demand. Difference-in-difference estimates 
show that the demand shock caused technical change as corn producers 
adopted higher quality seeds which in turn raised productivity by 7%. 
We develop a simple model that formalizes the mechanisms underlying 
our results.
I. INTRODUCTION
new technoloGies are a Key enGine of  productivity growth. While changes 
in firms’ technology mix are often based on cost considerations, economists 
have recognized since at least Schmookler [1954] that the incentive to adopt 
productivity-enhancing technologies also depends on demand conditions. 
The size of the market is essential in shaping the decision to introduce or 
adopt new technologies.
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In this paper, we present novel evidence that demand shocks provoke produc-
tivity improvements by inducing technology adoption. Much of our understand-
ing about the relationship between market size and productivity comes from 
the pharmaceutical industry (Acemoglu and Linn [2004]; Dubois et al. [2015]; 
Blume-Kohout and Sood [2013]). These studies find that market size promotes 
innovation, although with differently sized elasticities. The evidence presented 
in this paper supports this work, albeit for an industry where innovation is quite 
different. Innovation within the pharmaceutical sector is characterized by very 
expensive and very long innovation cycles, protected by strict legal protections. 
However, firms in many sectors of the economy rely on innovations by outside 
firms. The evidence we provide is for the adoption of an existing technology. 
Technology adoptions of this type are arguably, more likely to be prevalent in the 
wider economy, and responsive to smaller aggregate demand shocks.
Our tests revolve around a natural experiment in the U.S. corn industry. 
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EP Act) mandated an increase in the ethanol 
content of gasoline which sparked a wave of ethanol plant openings that 
raised demand for corn, the key intermediate input in ethanol production. 
The driving force behind the legislation was fear among national policymak-
ers that the U.S. economy was vulnerable to interruption of overseas energy 
supplies. The EP Act sought to improve energy independence and security 
through an array of measures including increased use of ethanol in gasoline 
(Diggs [2012]). Neither productivity nor technological considerations within 
the corn industry motivated the EP Act and there is no evidence of lobbying 
activity preceding the legislation, by either corn or seed producers.1 To estab-
lish causality we exploit the fact that the EP Act had no effect on demand for 
wheat which is produced in the same locations as corn, uses similar produc-
tion processes but is not used to manufacture ethanol.
Given our focus on established producers, we use difference-in-difference 
estimations that compare the evolution of physical productivity measures 
within the corn industry with wheat productivity in the same Midwestern 
county. We use crop yields (the number of bushels produced per acre), the 
standard measure of physical productivity in the agricultural sector and, in 
addition, we construct physical total factor productivity (TFPQ) which mea-
sures output using physical quantities and accounts for input usage, includ-
ing seed expenditures.2 Unlike other approaches that use revenue and 
industry-level price deflators to measure output, our productivity measures 
do not capture confounding price effects or adjustments to market power 
1 The plausible exogeneity of the demand shock is also reflected in a series of tests that exam-
ine the determinants of ethanol plant location. The location of ethanol plants were chosen stra-
tegically to minimize corn procurement costs (they located away from existing ethanol plants to 
avoid competition) and maximize revenue. We are able to show that their location was orthogo-
nal to productivity in the corn sector, a result previously confirmed by McAloon et al. [2000] and 
Sarmiento et al. [2012].
2 Foster et al. [2008] note that comparisons of TFPQ are more meaningful when variations in 
quality are small. This argument would appear to be relevant in the case of corn.
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that may make firms appear more productive even if  underlying technical 
efficiency is unchanged. Rather, we exclusively study how the changes in de-
mand affected technical efficiency.
Our estimates show that the demand shock caused a statistically signifi-
cant increase in productivity among the treatment group relative to the im-
plied counterfactual. Economically, the average treatment effect (ATE) 
equates to a 7% increase in yield per acre. In addition, we find a statistically 
significant 0.8% increase in TFPQ, indicating that the productivity gains do 
not simply capture adjustments to input usage. In fact, further tests show that 
the demand shock had no effect on the per acre quantity of capital, labor, 
fertilizer, seed or other intermediate inputs.3
Subsequent tests show that the productivity improvements are driven by 
technology adoption. Following the demand shock, corn producers rapidly 
adopted a new seed, stacked-variety corn seeds (SV seeds henceforth), that 
had been commercially available for several years but were seldom used. 
These represented an upgrading in the quality of inputs because they blend 
existing pest tolerance (Bt) and herbicide tolerance (Ht) genes into a sin-
gle variety. Stacked-variety seeds produce more bushels per acre relative to 
 single-gene (Bt or Ht) seed types by allowing the crop to get closer to its yield 
potential. However, farmers incur fixed costs when adopting SV seeds due to 
search costs, changes in production methods, and learning how to use differ-
ent machinery (Vyn [2010], Fernandez-Cornejo et al. [2018]).
We find the adoption of SV seeds caused a significant increase in produc-
tivity within the corn industry. A 10% increase in the SV technology leads to 
a 0.7% productivity gain. By the end of the sample period SV seeds account 
for approximately 50% of planted acres, indicating they account for the ma-
jority of the observed productivity gains. Our findings on the link between 
the adoption of new seeds and productivity growth echo the results in Bustos 
et al. [2016], who study the introduction of genetically engineered seeds in 
Brazil which raised labor productivity.
Technology adoption and productivity improvements could derive from 
supply-side forces. For example, if  the cost of SV seeds falls through time 
producers may adopt the more productive technology irrespective of demand 
conditions. The data decisively refute this view. First, there is no reduction in 
the per acre cost of SV seed during the sample period. Rather, stacked-variety 
seeds are more costly compared to single-gene seeds and this relative price 
difference actually grew through time. Second, falsification tests show no 
evidence of significant productivity increases among Texan corn producers 
that were unaffected by the ethanol demand shock. Operating practices, seed 
availability and seed prices are similar in the Corn Belt and Texas. However, 
their location far from ethanol plants and the high associated transport costs 
3 Evidence from the agricultural literature suggests that these additional TFP effects arose 
because of other complementary changes to farming practices, in particular to tillage.
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meant that the ethanol boom did not affect demand for Texan corn. If  reduc-
tions in technology costs undergird our main results we should uncover pro-
ductivity gains among corn producers in these regions of similar magnitude 
compared to in the Corn Belt. This is not the case.
Productivity could increase for other reasons. Such confounds include 
shocks to other sources of demand, climactic conditions during the growing 
season, changes in financial constraints and spillover effects on the control 
group. We explore these alternative mechanisms but find little support for 
them in the data. Moreover, our estimations include county-year fixed effects 
which rule out time-varying productivity and technological shocks common 
to both groups at the local and macro levels. This approach has the attractive 
property that the ATE is identified through comparisons of the treatment 
and control group within the same county-year.
We construct a simple model to provide a framework to interpret these re-
sults. An industry is composed of firms that are heterogeneous in productiv-
ity producing varieties of the same product. Since the adoption of SV seeds 
leads to a reduction in labor per unit of output, following Bustos et al. [2016] 
we characterize it as as labor-augmenting technical change. Each firm has the 
option to operate with its current technology or pay a fixed cost to adopt a 
superior, more productive technology. Due to the adoption cost, only a few 
highly productive firms can pay it and upgrade to the new technology. A 
larger market size leads to a higher share of firms adopting the more efficient 
technology. Hence, demand pull shocks generate increases in firms’ revenues 
which stimulates technology adoption and productivity growth.
Our research is important for three reasons. The corn industry accounts 
for a large share of U.S. agricultural employment and approximately 30% 
of agricultural output. Understanding the drivers of corn productivity dy-
namics therefore matters for the agricultural sector. Moreover, evidence from 
this industry is likely to generalize to other settings. Corn producers rely on 
off-the-shelf  technologies created by external firms. This is similar to the sit-
uation in many industries where R&D expenditure is concentrated within a 
select few companies. Our laboratory also allows us to exclusively study the 
effects of demand on productivity and shutdown the confounding competi-
tion channel that is present in studies assessing the effects of market size due 
to trade liberalization.
I(i). Literature Review
Our paper is related to several strands of literature. Market size is often viewed 
as an important determinant of productivity-enhancing investments such as 
innovation and technology adoption. Increases in actual or potential mar-
ket size generate profit incentives that pull firms into technological advances. 
Acemoglu and Linn [2004] formalize these ideas in a model of innovation 
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where current and future market size shape the direction of innovation. 
Similarly, market size and profit incentives play a central role in most growth 
models featuring endogenous R&D-driven technological progress (e.g., 
Romer [1990], Grossman and Helpman [1991], Aghion and Howitt [1992]) 
and in models of technology adoption (e.g., Parente and Prescott [1999]).
The link between market size, technological change and productivity has 
also been at the center of the recent literature on trade and firm heterogene-
ity. Our model contains insights from Yeaple [2005] and Bustos [2011], where 
heterogeneous firms select into technology upgrading following increases in 
market size brought about by trade liberalization. Recent models of trade 
and innovation embed both extensive and intensive margins of productiv-
ity growth in response to larger market size (Dhingra [2012], Impullitti and 
Licandro [2017], and Impullitti et al. [2017]).
Early studies by Schmookler [1954] and Griliches [1957] identified market 
size effects as a key force behind new inventions and technology adoption. 
Similarly, Jaffe [1988] and Cohen and Klepper [1996] find a positive link be-
tween firm size and R&D intensity. In his summary of the available empirical 
evidence, Cohen [2010] argues that demand-pull theories do not typically sur-
vive empirical scrutiny however, in part because they often ignore important 
industry characteristics, use imperfect proxies for demand and lack compel-
ling strategies to deal with issues of endogeneity.
A large empirical macro and trade literature studies the effects of market 
size on technological change. Owing to difficulties in establishing causality 
in macro settings, a more common approach in recent years has been to use 
micro data and specific policy induced liberalization events. For example, 
Bustos [2011] shows that the introduction of MERCOSUR, a large regional 
trade agreement, had a strong impact on several measures of technical change 
at the firm level, including R&D, spending on technology transfers, and cap-
ital goods that embody new technologies. She finds that increases in revenue 
generated by tariff  reductions lead exporters to innovate. Lileeva and Trefler 
[2010] show that Canadian firms which experienced an increase in market 
size following the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement raised their labor pro-
ductivity by investing in innovation and adopting new technologies. Griffith 
et al. [2010] find that the EU Single Market Programme (SMP), which de-
regulated the product market, is associated with increased product mar-
ket competition and with increases in innovation and productivity growth. 
While these papers emphasize the importance of increased market potential 
in driving this change, trade liberalization typically occurs simultaneously 
with changes in competition. This point is made by Aghion et al. [2017] who 
analyze the effects of demand shocks generated by exports on French firms’ 
innovation decisions. They find evidence of a market size effect of exports 
on innovation, which can be offset by increased competition on innovation 
effort. In our setting, tariffs on ethanol are high and do not change, acting as 
a barrier to import competition. In addition, in an industry characterized by 
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a few large firms with high sunk costs, such as corn, the entry margin is not 
likely to be strong and we should not expect large pro-competitive effects of 
changes in demand. This allows for a better identification of the market size 
effects of a demand shock.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we outline a the-
oretical model to help interpret the empirical results. We describe the data 
set in Section III. Section IV provides an overview of the corn and ethanol 
industries and the key legislative changes that motivate our empirical frame-
work. We outline our identification strategy and provide the main results in 
Section V. Section VI contains an exhaustive set of robustness tests. 
Conclusions are drawn in Section VII.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL
We devise a simple model of technology adoption to highlight some key eco-
nomic mechanisms which help interpret our empirical findings. As we detail 
below, there exists a high degree of heterogeneity in size and productivity 
across corn producers in different counties. We therefore outline a model in 
which firms differ along these margins.4
II(i). Economic Environment
Corn is produced in many substitutable varieties by a continuum of monopo-
listically competitive firms.5 Each variety j is produced by a firm with a pro-
ductivity z̃ drawn from a Pareto distribution F (z̃) with shape k and location 
z̃min.
6 After observing productivity, firms decide whether or not to enter and 
produce. After entering, firms can produce output with technology 
where l represents the labor resources needed to produce quantity x of  va-
riety j. Alternatively, the firm can upgrade its technology by paying a fixed 
adoption cost λ > 0. The upgraded technology is 
4 Although we do not have firm-level data, the fact that land quality varies little across space 
suggests the presence of substantial firm heterogeneity across corn producers.
5 The monopolistic competition assumption is not necessary for the results, which would hold 
also in a perfectly competitive economy with heterogeneous firms as in Hopenhayn [1992].
6 While our simple model solely aims at providing economic intuition, a direct map with the 
empirical analysis could be made by assuming that all firms within a county have the same 
productivity.
(1) lj =
xj
z̃j
,
(2) lj =
xj
?̃? z̃j
+𝜆,
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where ?̃? > 1. Hence, once a firm has observed its productivity draw, z̃, it can 
decide whether to operate at zero fixed cost and a higher variable cost, or to 
upgrade to a technology with a positive fixed cost and a lower variable cost. 
This formulation of the adoption problem is motivated by evidence that the 
shift to SV seeds imposes substantial fixed costs upon producers. For exam-
ple, producers must learn how to use new production practices and machin-
ery, and incur search costs finding the SV seeds most suited to local growing 
conditions (Vyn [2010], Fernandez-Cornejo et al. [2018]).
II(ii). Equilibrium
We outline a partial equilibrium model assuming that wages are given and 
normalized to 1, and that each variety faces inverse demand 
with α ∈ (0,1), where D̂ is an exogenous demand shifter determining the mar-
ket size of each firm.
In equilibrium each firm produces one variety. We therefore drop the j sub-
scripts and indicate varieties with their productivity z̃. Firm profit maximiza-
tion leads to the standard optimal pricing pl(z̃) = 1∕𝛼z̃ and ph(z̃) = 1∕𝛼?̃? z̃, 
where i = l,h indicates whether the firm produces with the low or high vari-
able cost technology after entry. Profits from using the two technologies are 
 
where z = z̃
𝛼
1−𝛼, 𝛾 = ?̃?
𝛼
1−𝛼, ?̂? = (1−𝛼)𝛼
𝛼
1−𝛼 and D̂ = D
1
1−𝛼. A firm with produc-
tivity z̃ upgrades its technology if  𝜋l (z̃) ≤ 𝜋h (z̃), hence the firm for which 
this condition holds with equality determines the technology adoption, or 
upgrading cutoff, z∗
h
. The cutoff  condition is 
An increase in demand for any variety of corn, i.e., an increase in D̂, re-
duces the adoption cutoff, z∗
h
. The economic intuition is straightforward: a 
surge in demand increases the size of the market for each firm, thereby allow-
ing more firms to cover the fixed cost of adopting the superior technology. 
Average industry productivity is 
(3) pj = D̂x
𝛼−1
j
,
(4) 𝜋l (z̃)=
(
pl(z̃)−
1
z̃
)
xl (z̃)= ?̂?D̂z,
(5) 𝜋h (z̃)=
(
ph(z̃)−
1
?̃? z̃
)
xh(z̃)= ?̂?D̂𝛾z−𝜆,
(AC) z∗h =
𝜆
?̂? (𝛾−1) D̂
.
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where f (z) = zk
m
z−−1 is the productivity density function. It is easy to see 
that as a larger share of firms adopts the new technology, the industry as a 
whole becomes more productive. Our simple model therefore predicts an in-
crease in adoption of the more productive technology and an increase in av-
erage productivity following a positive demand shock. Notice that a reduction 
in the adoption cutoff  can also be generated by a reduction in the adoption 
cost, λ.7
II(iii). Discussion
The model can also be used to ask whether the observed increase in produc-
tivity could be the result of more intensive use of a fixed input rather than 
the adoption of a more productive input. Abstracting from technology adop-
tion, the expansion of market size, D̂, could increase a revenue-based meas-
ure of productivity but not the physical/technological productivity which is 
the focus of our empirical analysis. Revenue-based productivity for firm z̃ 
that adopts the new technology is computed as revenues over total costs, 
Increasing a firm’s market size, through an increase in demand D̂ reduces the 
incidence of the fixed cost, thereby increasing the firm’s revenue-based pro-
ductivity. Our key empirical results below, however, show that the demand 
shock increases physical productivity (yields and TFPQ). This implies that 
the observed increase in efficiency cannot be due to economies of scale com-
ing from the more intensive use of a fixed input.
Finally, the increase in aggregate productivity in the corn industry ob-
served in the data could be the result of a selection effect which forces the 
less productive firms out of the market. In Online Appendix C we show that 
selection effects do not play a role for observed increases in productivity. It 
is still useful to analyse this effect in the model. Let us assume that all firms 
have to pay a fixed operating cost, p. Now the adoption cutoff is determined 
by z∗
h
= (𝜆+𝜆p)∕
(
?̂? (𝛾−1) D̂
)
, but there is also a survival cutoff  z∗ below 
which non-adopting firms will not break even z∗ = 𝜆p∕?̂?D̂. It is easy to see 
z̄=∫
z∗
h
zmin
zf (z) dz+𝛾 ∫
∞
z∗
h
zf (z) dz,=
𝜅zmin
𝜅−1
[
1+(𝛾−1)
(
z∗
h
zmin
)1−𝜅
]
,
7 Our empirical findings strongly refute the possibility that the adoption choice is generated by 
this supply-side channel. For example, Table A.1 shows no decrease in the cost of SV seeds 
during the sample period. Moreover, Figure 5 shows a strong positive correlation between the 
rate of SV adoption and ethanol capacity, a proxy for market size.
ph(z̃)xh(z̃)
xh(z̃)
z̃
+𝜆
=
1
𝛼+
𝜆
𝛼
1
1−𝛼 D̂𝛾z
.
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that an increase in demand D̂ decreases the survival cutoff  z∗: larger market 
size makes survival easier. Aggregate sectoral productivity becomes 
where a reduction in the survival cutoff  reduces aggregate productivity, 
thereby offsetting the positive effect of technology adoption on productivity. 
In our simple model, the negative selection effect indeed dominates and an 
increase in demand leads to a reduction in aggregate productivity. Using the 
two cutoff  conditions we get z∗
h
= z∗(𝜆p+𝜆)∕𝜆p(?̂?−1), so aggregate produc-
tivity is increasing in the survival cutoff  z∗ and decreasing in the exogenous 
demand component.8 Hence, this provides further theoretical support to our 
empirical hypothesis that technology adoption is the key force behind the 
increase in productivity in the corn industry.
III. DATA
We retrieve productivity data from the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service (NASS) - the statistics branch of the United States Department for 
Agriculture (USDA). As part of its mission, the NASS collects information 
on crop yields (bushels per acre), the dominant measure of productivity 
within agriculture, in industry i in county c during year t. We therefore have 
annual productivity data for the corn and wheat industries within each 
county-industry over the period 2000 to 2007. In total the sample contains 
12,344 observations, drawn from 843 counties located in the 12 states that 
form the Corn Belt.9 The decision to restrict the sample to the Corn Belt is 
predicated on the fact that both the corn and ethanol industries are geo-
graphically concentrated in the region: 88% of national corn and 93% of 
ethanol production takes place there. Further information on acres planted, 
the number of firms per acre and irrigation (the ratio of irrigated acreage to 
total acres) for each county-industry-year is taken from the NASS.
In the empirical analysis we also use physical total factor productivity 
(TFPQ) which accounts for input use and measures output in physical quan-
tities (bushels per acre in this case). A key advantage of both the yield and 
TFPQ variables is that changes in productivity cannot be driven by price 
shocks, market power, factor market distortions or changes in the product 
z̄=∫
z∗
h
z∗
zf (z) dz+𝛾 ∫
∞
z∗
h
zf (z) dz,=
𝜅z∗
𝜅−1
[
1+(𝛾−1)
(
z∗
h
z∗
)1−𝜅
]
,
8 In a more general model where an increase in market size can generate an increase in the 
wages of the workers in the industry, the result would be less stark, as higher wages would push 
the survival cutoff  in the opposite direction.
9 The 12 states in the sample are Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin.
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mix which frequently contaminate productivity estimates when revenue is 
used to measure output and firm-level price data are unavailable.
One constraint we face in constructing TFPQ in the corn and wheat indus-
tries is that the NASS does not release data on capital stocks, labor, material, 
and energy inputs at the county-industry level. However, annual state- 
industry level information is available from the ERS Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS). Following Foster et al. [2008], TFPQ is con-
structed using the typical index form 
where i, s and t denote industry, state and year, respectively; the lower-case 
letters indicate the natural logarithm of output, capital stock, labor hours, 
material inputs, and energy inputs; and j (j ∈ (k, l, m, e)) are the correspond-
ing factor elasticities. All inputs and output are measured per acre. Labor 
inputs are measured in hours, capital as the value of machinery services used, 
and material inputs are the sum of expenditures on fertilizer, lime, seeds, 
herbicide and insecticide.
We deflate capital, material, and the other inputs into 2000 values using 
their respective NASS input price index. That is, we have a separate price 
index for each input. Recent work by De Loecker et al. [2016] highlights the 
problem of unobserved input prices in the context of productivity estimation 
and the associated difficulty in identifying the underlying drivers of produc-
tivity growth. By using input-specific price indices we overcome these issues. 
To construct the labor, material, and energy input elasticities, we use indus-
tries’ average cost shares over our sample. Capital cost shares are measured as 
the capital stock (the sum of farm equipment, land and buildings) multiplied 
by the capital rental rates reported by Duffy [2010].
Information on technology adoption is also taken from the ARMS data-
base. This source provides annual data on the share of corn acres planted 
using SV seeds (the ratio of corn acres planted with SV seeds to total corn 
acres) for each state from 2000 onward. Corn producers have access to two 
types of corn seed. Single-gene varieties are GE seeds that contain genetic 
traits that either protect the plant from herbicide poisoning or pests (Ht 
or Bt). SV seeds combine both traits. Experimental trials have consistently 
shown SV seeds to produce higher yields per acre by preventing destruction 
of the crop. However, SV seeds typically retail at a premium to single-gene 
seeds as shown in Online Appendix Table A.1. Both types of seed were com-
mercially available throughout the sample period. In contrast, wheat produc-
ers only have access to single-gene variety seeds. SV wheat seeds have not yet 
been developed.
We match the productivity and technology adoption data to information 
on the ethanol industry taken from The Ethanol Industry Outlook, an an-
nual industry journal published by the Renewable Fuels Association. This 
(6) tfpist=yist−kkist−l list−mmict−eeist,
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contains annual plant-level data on the owner, capacity (operating and under 
construction), location, and feedstock of every ethanol plant in the U.S. We 
aggregate the plant-level data to the county level. We include only plants 
that use corn as a feedstock on the grounds that others are irrelevant to corn 
producers.
The remaining variables used in the econometric analysis are listed in 
Table I. This includes various types of input usage (ARMS), precipitation 
and extreme temperature, measured as the share of days with temperatures 
above the 90th percentile over the growing season (Weather Underground).10  
A complete description of each variable is provided in Online Appendix A.
IV. OVERVIEW OF THE CORN AND ETHANOL INDUSTRIES AND LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGES
In this section we outline important details regarding the production and 
distribution of ethanol, as well as the key reforms to U.S. energy policy that 
sparked the ethanol boom.
IV(i). The Ethanol Production and Distribution Process
Ethanol is a clean-burning, high-octane motor fuel. Almost all ethanol is 
derived from starch- and sugar-based feedstocks. The ease with which these 
sugars can be extracted from corn makes it the preferred feedstock of large-
scale, commercial ethanol producers (USDE [2013]).11 The production pro-
cess involves converting starch-based crops into ethanol either by dry or wet 
mill processing. More than 80% of ethanol plants in the U.S. are dry mills 
due to lower capital costs (McAloon et al. [2000], USDE [2012]). During the 
dry milling process the corn kernel is ground into flour and subsequently 
fermented to make ethanol. By-products of this process include distillers’ dry 
grains (DDG’s), which can be sold as animal feed. Wet mill plants steep corn 
in a dilute sulfuric acid solution in order to separate the starch, protein, and 
fiber content. The corn starch component can then be fermented into etha-
nol through a process similar to that used in dry milling, while the steep water 
is sold as a livestock feed ingredient.
Corn accounts for approximately 60% of ethanol production costs, with 
the remainder attributable to natural gas (15%), other variable costs (12%), 
and fixed costs (13%) (Hofstrand [2013]). The distribution process entails 
10 We match each county to the nearest weather station because not all counties contain a 
weather station.
11 According to USDE [2013] over 90% of U.S. ethanol production relies on corn as a feed-
stock. Owing to differences in their chemical properties, multiple feedstocks cannot be mixed 
together during production. None of the ethanol plants in our sample use wheat as a 
feedstock.
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shipping harvested corn from farms and co-ops to ethanol plants using lor-
ries which are the low-cost transport option (McNew and Griffith [2005], 
Fatal [2011]). Tanker trucks and rail cars are subsequently used to transport 
manufactured ethanol to a terminal for blending. The blended gasoline is 
then distributed to gasoline retailers or stored.
IV(ii). Legislative Changes
The origins, of the ethanol boom lie in a series of political issues that culmi-
nated in the 2005 EP Act. During the early 2000’s a perception grew within 
national policymaking circles that the U.S. economy was overly reliant on 
foreign energy supplies that were vulnerable to interruption (Diggs [2012]). In 
response to these pressures, the EP Act aimed to improve national energy 
independence and security by stimulating various forms of domestic energy 
production. Part of this legislative agenda sought to displace crude oil im-
ports and reduce reliance on foreign energy sources by promoting greater use 
of ethanol in gasoline. The EP Act mandated a rise in the ethanol content of 
gasoline from 4 billion gallons in 2006 to 7.5 billion in 2012. In addition, the 
EP Act set a target, known as the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), that a 
minimum 10% of gasoline should be made up of ethanol in future.12 The 
subsequent Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 set yet higher 
targets, mandating a minimum 36 billion gallon ethanol content by 2022.
IV(iii). The Ethanol Boom
The volumetric ethanol production targets and the RFS guaranteed ethanol 
demand. Ethanol producers also benefited from a 51 cent per gallon tax 
credit paid through the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit (VEETC), and 
were shielded from competition with foreign ethanol producers by an import 
tariff  of $143/m3 levied on imported ethanol.13 Because vehicles did not re-
quire engine modifications to run on blended ethanol, most gasoline retailers 
throughout the U.S. began to offer E10, a fuel mixture of 10% ethanol and 
90% gasoline. Automobile manufacturers also promoted blended gasoline by 
introducing car engines capable of running on E15 and E85.14 Following suc-
cessful engine performance tests, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
12 The USDA Feed Grains Database reports that by 2009 the ethanol market share of the U.S. 
gasoline industry had reached 8% as a result of the energy legislation.
13 The VEETC was created under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. It was renewed as 
part of the Farm Bill of 2008 at a lower rate of $0.45 per gallon of ethanol blended with 
gasoline.
14 Sales of e85-engine vehicles account for between 33% and 40% of annual auto sales during 
the sample period. In 2000 approximately 2.2 million e85 vehicles were sold compared to 
2.8 million in 2007.
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authorized the use of blended gasoline in all motorcycles, heavy duty vehicles 
and non-road engines.
Online Appendix Figure A.1 illustrates the wave of investment in new eth-
anol plants, and the geographical concentration of entry on the Corn Belt. 
Entrants account for 76% of capacity expansion during the sample period. 
Table II provides further detail on these patterns. Between 2002 and 2007 the 
number of ethanol plants increased from 56 to 151 and capacity increased by 
almost 225%. Much of this entry occurred in the two years after implemen-
tation of the EP Act when the net entry rate spiked to 32% and 41%. The 
average plant operating capacity is 56 million gallons per year (mgy) and 
there is an upward trend in this average (48 mgy in 2002 versus 57 mgy in 
2007), reflecting the entry of larger plants and capacity expansions.15
Figure 1 documents the increasing importance of the ethanol sector as a 
source of the demand for corn following enactment of the EP Act. During 
the years prior to 2005 approximately 11% of national corn production was 
used to manufacture ethanol. Following the expansion of ethanol produc-
tion capacity this value steadily increased to 25% by 2007 and 40% in 2010. 
In addition, Online Appendix Figure A.3 shows that the increase in ethanol 
demand did not displace other sources of corn demand such that demand for 
corn was strictly higher after 2005.
V. EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
V(i). Identification Strategy
Isolating causality revolves around a difference-in-difference estimation 
strategy. We estimate the equation 
15 3.5 billion gallons of ethanol were contained in gasoline in 2004, compared to 13.3 billion 
gallons in 2010. Online Appendix Figure A.2 shows that the market share of ethanol imports is 
close to 0 in all years.
table ii  
ethanol industry evolution
Year Plants Net Entry (%) Capacity (mgy) Multiplant (%)
2002 56 2,240 15
2003 62 10.71 2,505 11
2004 72 16.13 2,948 10
2005 81 12.50 3,473 10
2006 107 32.10 4,052 12
2007 151 41.12 5,022 10
Notes: This table provides information on the number of ethanol plants, the net entry rate, operating capac-
ity in the Corn Belt (in mgy) for each year of the sample. Multiplant is the percentage of plants within the 
industry that belong to a multiplant firm. The Ethanol Industry Outlook does not provide plant-level data 
before 2002.
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where yict is an outcome variable (productivity or TFPQ) in industry i in re-
gion c (either a county or state) at time t; Cornic is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if  the observation is from the corn industry, 0 otherwise. We measure demand 
using the standard difference-in-difference dummy variable, Postt, which is 
equal to 1 for the years 2005-2007 when the EP Act is in force, 0 otherwise. 
We also experiment with a continuous demand measure, ethanol capacity, 
which captures ethanol production capacity within 200 miles of the county. 
The choice of 200 miles is based on estimates from the agricultural econom-
ics literature, which suggests that ethanol producers procure corn from farms 
within this range to ensure timeliness of supply and, because ethanol manu-
facturers bear the transport expenses, to minimize shipping costs (Hofstrand 
[2013], McAloon et al. [2000], Sarmiento et al. [2012], USDE [2013]).
The regressions include a vector of control variables, Xict, while ict is the 
error term. We also include a set of region-year (ct) and region-industry (ic) 
dummy variables to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity. In the yield (TFPQ) 
tests the region is defined as a county (state). Region-year effects capture 
(7) yict=ic+Cornic ∗Postt+Xict+ct+ict,
Figure 1  
Share of U.S. Corn Used to Produce Ethanol 
Notes: This figure plots the annual percentage of national corn production used to manufacture 
ethanol between 2000 and 2010. The data are taken from the USDA Feed Grains Database. The 
vertical line represents the beginning of 2005, the year when the EP Act was signed into law. 
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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all time-varying productivity determinants that are common to both groups 
and coincide with treatment (such as climatic shocks or adjustments to tax 
rates). This tight focus provides an ideal estimating environment because the 
ATE is identified through cross-industry variation within the region-year di-
mension of the data. To purge time-invariant productivity determinants that 
are region specific, but differentially affect the dependent variable within the 
treatment and control groups, we include region-industry effects. We cluster 
the standard errors at the region level in line with Bertrand et al. [2005].
Central to this approach is establishing an implied counterfactual. We choose 
the wheat industry because it is ubiquitous throughout the Corn Belt, uses a 
similar production process to corn and is planted and harvested at the same time 
as corn meaning that it is subject to similar climatic conditions over the growing 
season. Wheat, like corn, can in principle be used to produce ethanol. However, 
this use is very small in the aggregate. Wheat is not used as an input by the ethanol 
producers in our sample and there is evidence that converting ethanol plants to 
use wheat as a feedstock is unlikely. According to the Environmental Protection 
Agency, 0.4% of total U.S. ethanol production is made from wheat and milo 
grains. Industry sources state that U.S. ethanol producers do not switch to using 
wheat for ethanol owing to 1) the process of retrofitting plants to grind wheat 
instead of corn is costly, 2) ethanol yields from wheat are 20-30% lower com-
pared to the same weight of corn, and 3) wheat does not produce the distillers 
dry grains that are sold by ethanol producers as an additional source of revenue.
The key identifying assumption underlying our tests is the parallel trends 
assumption. Figure 2 plots productivity in the corn and wheat industries 
during the sample period. Before 2005, productivity evolves in a very similar 
way within both industries. The parallel trends assumption therefore holds. 
However, after 2005 productivity in the corn industry begins to increase 
whereas wheat productivity does not.
Difference-in-difference estimates are more convincing when the treatment 
and control groups are similar ex ante. We therefore use t-tests to examine the 
similarity of the production process (measured using inputs per acre) during the 
pre-treatment period. Table III shows we cannot reject the null of equality in the 
per acre value of land and buildings, machinery, labor, fertilizer and seed inputs. 
Together these pieces of evidence suggest that wheat is a valid counterfactual.16
16 An implicit identifying assumption is that when deciding on where to plant corn and wheat, 
farmers do not switch wheat to inferior land to make way for corn. If  this assumption fails, then 
the productivity of wheat may fall. We cannot definitively rule out this possibility. However, two 
pieces of evidence suggest this was not the case and that wheat productivity was similar before 
and after the EP Act. First, Figure 4 shows a high degree of overlap in the distribution of wheat 
productivity in 2000 and 2007. Second, using data from the wheat industry we estimated the 
equation yieldct = Post2005t+Xct+c+ct, where yieldct is the natural logarithm of wheat 
productivity in county c during year t, Post2005t is a dummy variable equal to 1 for the years 
2005, 2006 and 2007, 0 otherwise, Xct is the vector of controls, c denote county fixed effects, and 
ct is the error term. β indicates the change in wheat productivity between the pre and post-EP 
Act periods within counties. We estimate β to be 0.0111 (t-statistic = 1.09). The insignificant 
coefficient suggests there was little change in wheat productivity between the periods.
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V(ii). Econometric Results
Before reporting formal empirical tests of the demand-productivity relation-
ship, we provide some descriptive evidence on the suggestive patterns within 
the raw data. In Figure 3 we compare the productivity distribution in 2000 to 
the situation in 2007 when the demand shock has taken effect. There is a clear 
Figure 2  
Productivity Evolution 
Notes: This figure plots yield per acre in natural logarithms in the corn and wheat industries 
during the sample period. The vertical line represents the beginning of 2005, the year when the 
EP Act was signed into law. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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table iii  
pre-treatment Group comparisons
Variable Corn Wheat Diff. Std. Error t-stat
Land and buildings 52.75 50.74 −1.80 5.76 −0.32
Machinery 39.45 39.77 0.32 2.52 0.06
Labor 1.84 1.63 −0.22 0.33 −0.66
Fertilizer 31.69 29.84 −1.85 5.11 −0.36
Seed 32.40 30.16 −2.24 1.61 1.39
Notes: This table presents the results of t-tests on the equality of input expenditure per acre 
between the corn and wheat industries during 2000 to 2004.
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unambiguous increase in average industry productivity with a large right-
ward shift in the survival productivity threshold.17 In contrast, Figure 4 
shows wheat productivity did not respond to the demand shock. Online 
Appendix Figure A.5 provides clear evidence across all states in the sample 
that the passing of the EP Act coincides with the steep section of the familiar 
S-shaped technology adoption function. The evidence reported in Figure 5 
affirms that demand conditions lie at the heart of our findings. Specifically, 
the figure illustrates that technology adoption is positively correlated with 
increases in local ethanol capacity, a strong proxy for demand.18
Turning to econometric methods, Table IV reports estimates of Equation 
(7) that provide evidence that the demand shock caused a significant increase 
in productivity within the corn industry. Column 1 of Table IV reports esti-
mates from a simple difference-in-difference model based on Equation (7) 
17 Figure A.4 in the Online Appendix reports the distribution of productivity in 2000 and 2007 
taking into account year effects. This ensures that the patterns in the data do not simply repre-
sent trends towards higher productivity through time. The evolution of productivity is very 
similar.
18 The correlation is also highly statistically significant. Correlation = 0.40 (p-value = 0.00).
Figure 3  
Corn Productivity Response to the Demand Shock 
Notes: This figure shows kernel density plots the distribution of yield per acre in the corn 
industry in 2000 and 2007. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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without any control variables. The effect is economically meaningful and 
highly statistically significant. The ATE is estimated to be equivalent to a 
7.6% increase in productivity.
In column 2 of Table IV we add as controls the number of acres planted, 
the incidence of irrigation technologies and the number of operating firms. 
The number of acres planted captures the possible effects of increasing or 
decreasing returns to scale. For example, farmers may make productivity in-
vestments following the demand shock but they might also cultivate increas-
ingly marginal land which would tend to attenuate the ATE. We find that 
the correlation is both negative and statistically significant. The irrigation 
coefficient is estimated to be statistically insignificant. The number of firms 
per acre captures competitive effects. Consistent with this intuition we find 
a 10% increase in the number of firms is associated with a 0.47% increase in 
yield. The addition of these controls does little to alter the estimated effect of 
the EP Act on yield per acre.
Central to the empirical strategy is the claim that the demand shock was due 
to the expansion of the ethanol industry. To verify that changes in market size 
drive our inferences, we interact the corn dummy variable with the ethanol 
Figure 4  
Wheat Productivity during the Sample Period 
Notes: This figure shows kernel density plots the distribution of yield per acre in the wheat 
industry in 2000 and 2007. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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capacity variable.19 The estimates in column 3 of Table IV show that a 10% 
 increase in local ethanol capacity causes a 0.5% increase in corn productivity. 
Considering ethanol operating capacity for the average county increased from 
455 mgy in 2004 to 1,040 mgy in 2007, the estimates imply demand from the 
ethanol industry provoked an 11.9% productivity increase.20
In columns 4 and 5 of Table IV we present evidence from regressions in 
which TFPQ is the dependent variable in equation (7). Here we find that 
the demand shock had a smaller effect, an increase of 0.78%. The smaller 
TFPQ response relative to the increase in yield found elsewhere in the table is 
consistent with the argument above that when we account for the increase in 
seed expenditure when calculating TFPQ, the improvement in TFPQ is small 
19 Evidence indicates that, because ethanol plants were primarily located in the Corn Belt, the 
increase in the number of acres of corn that were planted within each county was economically 
small. Fatal [2011] finds a positive effect on corn acreage up to 286 miles from ethanol plants. He 
estimates that a new 100 mgy ethanol plant increased corn acreage by just 0.52%, and that the 
increase in a county’s acreage of corn that occurred would supply just 0.21% of the total ethanol 
capacity of the new ethanol plant. For producers close to new ethanol plants the incentive was 
to make existing land more productive rather than convert acreage to growing corn.
20 This finding is robust to defining the local market using a 100 mile radius.
Figure 5  
Ethanol Demand and Technical Change 
Notes: This figure plots the annual change in the share of corn acres planted with SV seeds 
against the annual change in ethanol capacity in each state. [Colour figure can be viewed at 
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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because SV seeds are more expensive than single-gene seeds. The agricultural 
economics literature discusses other sources of productivity gains that have 
followed from experience in using SV seeds. Of some importance appear to 
have been reduced tillage requirements. Reductions in the number of times 
farmers needed to till the soil led to reduced fertilizer run-off, lower gasoline 
costs, and higher TFPQ.
The remaining columns in Table IV tie the observed productivity gains 
to the adoption of SV seed. We first approach this question by including an 
interaction between the corn dummy variable and the share of acres planted 
with SV seed in Equation (7). The estimates in column 6 show a significant 
positive relationship between the adoption of SV seeds and productivity 
within the corn industry. A 10% increase in the incidence of SV seed is esti-
mated to increase corn productivity by 0.93%.
Intuitively, one would anticipate the effects of the SV seed technology to 
be more pronounced among corn producers where adoption rates are high-
est. We therefore estimate a triple-difference model 
where all variables are defined as before except SVseedct which is the share of 
acres planted with SV seed in each state-year.
The results of Equation (8) are reported in column 7 of Table IV. The Corn-
Post interaction coefficient remains positive and statistically significant but is 
economically smaller compared to previous specifications. However, this is 
consistent with the Corn-SV seed and Corn-Post-SV seed interactions that are 
highly statistically significant and economically important. In essence, the 
post 2005 increase in corn productivity is driven by technology adoption. The 
triple interaction coefficient indicates that within the corn industry, productiv-
ity increased relatively more post 2005 in areas that adopted the SV seed tech-
nology to a greater extent.21 Hence, adoption of the new technology underlies 
the productivity gains we observe following the demand shock.22
(8)
yict= ic+1Cornic ∗Postt+2Cornic ∗SVseedct
+
3
Cornic ∗Postt ∗SVseedct+Xict+ct+ict,
21 USDA field trials show that stacked-variety corn seeds produce 171 bushels per acre versus 
134 for single-gene seeds. By the end of our sample period stacked varieties accounted for ap-
proximately 25% of acres planted. This implies a productivity increase of 9.25 bushels per acre. 
Consistent with this, the 7% ATE we estimate is equivalent to a 9.38 bushel per acre increase in 
productivity.
22 In the model, technology adoption involves sunk costs. An alternative explanation could be 
that adoption is a function of prices and the value of variable investments. In that case, one 
would expect to observe a reduction in the incidence of the stacked-variety technology as prices 
fall following contractions in demand. On the other hand, if  the sunk cost assumption is correct, 
the incidence of the technology would be invariant to price changes. This is indeed the case. The 
data show that relative to prices in 2008, corn prices fell in 2009 and 2010. This was not accom-
panied by a fall in the incidence of stacked varieties. In 2008 50% of acres were planted using 
stacked variety seeds compared to 54.1% in 2009 and 55.7% in 2010. The incidence of the tech-
nology also does not decline after 2013 when corn prices fell dramatically.
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VI. THREATS TO IDENTIFICATION
Before concluding that demand shocks improve productivity causally, we 
rule out potential confounding influences. In our setting, the main concern is 
that the demand shock correlates with unknown contemporaneous improve-
ments in the local business environment, rather than capturing a change in 
demand. Our estimation strategy takes important steps to alleviate this con-
cern by including county-year and state-year fixed effects which eliminate 
most plausible sources of unobserved heterogeneity. Thus, to bias our results, 
any omitted variable(s) would have to coincide with the EP Act and differ-
entially affect the corn and wheat industries. We therefore review a series of 
events that occur throughout our sample period and empirically establish 
whether they confound our inferences.
VI(i). Inputs and Technology Costs
An obvious confound could be that corn producers increased other factor 
inputs rather than adopting SV seeds to raise yields. The evidence in col-
umns 1 to 5 of Table V indicates that this was not the case. Specifically, using 
Equation (7) we find no evidence of a significant change in the per acre capi-
tal stock, labor, fertilizer or the incidence of productivity-enhancing irriga-
tion technologies within the corn sector post 2005.
In column 6, we explore whether the technical change we observe in the 
data was due to a reduction in seed costs. That is, adoption of stacked- 
varieties is driven by supply-side factors rather than from the demand side as 
explained by the ethanol boom. The results in column 6 of Table V indicate 
this was not the case. Rather, there are no differential trends in seed costs 
between the treatment and control groups post 2005. The descriptive evi-
dence in Online Appendix Table A.1 also refutes that falling technology costs 
drive the results. Specifically, it shows that the real cost of SV seeds increased 
strongly through the sample period.23
VI(ii). Falsification Tests
As an extension of the idea that there might be alternative explanations for 
the productivity improvements that we observe, we conduct two falsification 
23 One could argue that the main barrier to technology adoption was societal attitudes towards 
GE technology. For example, consumers may be hesitant about purchasing food produced using 
GE seeds. The demand shock may have alleviated this constraint because farmers could use SV 
seeds to supply the ethanol industry. This argument is implausible for two reasons. First, SV 
seeds contain the same traits (herbicide and pesticide resistance) contained in single-gene corn 
seeds that are used for food production. Second, by the end of the sample period almost 50% of 
planted acres used stacked-varieties despite ethanol’s accounting for 35% of corn sales. It there-
fore seems that there were general equilibrium effects as the demand shock led to technical 
change throughout the corn industry, regardless of the eventual use of corn.
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tests. We leverage the fact that corn is produced in Texas but producers there 
did not experience a change in demand after 2005.24 Given that operating 
conditions in Texas are similar to the Corn Belt but the ethanol industry is 
essentially absent, we would expect to see productivity increases of similar 
magnitude in these areas if  some spurious industry trend is responsible for 
the observed productivity increase. When we use the Texan sample in column 
1 of Table VI, the Corn-Post interaction coefficient is statistically insignifi-
cant. The key message from this test is that productivity only increased in 
corn-producing areas that were exposed to the demand shock.
Our second falsification test rules out that diverging pre-treatment produc-
tivity trends or anticipation effects drive our findings. We restrict the sample 
period to 2000 to 2004 and generate a placebo treatment dummy variable 
that takes the value of 1 from 2002 onward, 0 otherwise. We then interact 
the Corn and Placebo dummy variables. The results of this test in column 
2 of Table VI show the placebo interaction is statistically insignificant. 
Hence, corn producers did not anticipate the EP Act. Corn productivity only 
increased following the demand shock.
VI(iii). Other Demand Shocks
Clean identification requires that there were no coinciding changes in de-
mand for corn from other sources following implementation of the EP Act. 
We therefore append the estimating equation with interactions between the 
corn dummy variable and other demand variables and report the results in 
columns 3 to 5 of Table VI. Despite controlling for differential shocks to 
 export, food and feed demand, the Corn-Post coefficient remains positive, 
statistically significant and comparable in magnitude to the baseline results.
Another potential concern is that the EP Act coincides with state-level 
bans on the use of methyl-tert butyl ether (MTBE) following its discovery in 
ground water and evidence linking ingestion to carcinogenic diseases. MTBE 
is a gasoline oxygenate that helps improve motor engine performance and 
reduces vehicle exhaust emissions. MTBE was originally preferred to ethanol 
as a gasoline oxygenate because it is less prone to spontaneous combustion. 
Following the state bans, gasoline manufacturers switched from using MTBE 
to ethanol. The overall effect of this on the level of corn demand was modest, 
particularly within the Corn Belt where ethanol had historically been the 
preferred oxygenate (EIA [2000]). Legal challenges to the bans by MTBE 
24 Whereas the the average operating capacity of plants within 200 miles of the average 
Midwestern county is 1086 mgy the requisite figure in Texas is 14.2 mgy. Corn producers in 
Texas were unaffected by the ethanol boom because high transport costs make it unfeasible to 
sell corn to distant ethanol plants in the Corn Belt. Historically, ethanol producers chose not to 
locate in Texas due to the absence of state-level biofuel incentives, and because ethanol was not 
used as a gasoline oxygenate.
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producers may explain the limited response of ethanol producers. It was only 
later, in 2006, when MTBE producers were denied liability protection, that 
ethanol became the dominant oxygenate nationwide.
To capture changes in demand for corn arising from the state-level MTBE 
bans we use information from the Environmental Protection Agency to gen-
erate a dummy variable, MTBE (equals 1 if  a state has banned MTBE, 0 
otherwise), and interact it with the corn dummy variable. Estimates reported 
in column 6 of Table VI show that our main findings are robust to this change. 
Interestingly, the Corn-MTBE coefficient is positive and statistically signifi-
cant. Given that the MTBE demand shock was due to exogenous health con-
cerns this permanently reinforced corn demand. The findings therefore provide 
further support that increasing demand leads to productivity improvements.
VI(iv). Additional Robustness Tests
Next, we consider whether climatic shocks drive our inferences. The results in 
columns 7 and 8 of Table VI show that extreme temperature shocks and pre-
cipitation do not confound the effect of demand on productivity, respectively.
A further concern is that there might have been spillover effects on the 
control group through general equilibrium effects. If  so, the ATE’s would be 
spurious due to contamination of the implied counterfactual. To tackle this 
issue we first use alternative control groups. Column 1 of Online Appendix 
Table A.3 reports estimation results that use barley as the control group. Like 
corn, barley is a major cereal grain that can be used for animal fodder, but 
like wheat it cannot be used to produce ethanol. Despite the change in coun-
terfactual, we continue to reach the same conclusion as before.
The second procedure we adopt uses Monte Carlo simulations to test 
whether wheat productivity was directly affected by the EP Act. To imple-
ment this test we use the county-level wheat productivity data over 2000 to 
2007. We randomly assign 50% of counties to placebo treatment status and 
the rest to control status. The placebo treatment dummy is set equal to 1 for 
the years 2005 to 2007, and 0 otherwise. We then estimate the equation 
and repeat the procedure 1,000 times. As these regressions focus only on obser-
vations from the wheat industry, they provide an indication of whether condi-
tional on year effects, wheat yields within the county were significantly higher 
during the EP Act period compared to before. Given that demand for wheat 
did not change we would expect the placebo treatment dummy variable to be 
rejected only by chance. The rejection rates reported in Online Appendix Table 
A.4 Panel A are consistent with this view, and indicate no spillover effects.
Next, we investigate whether reallocation of market share explains our 
findings. In Online Appendix C we use the procedures outlined by Olley and 
(9) yieldit=i+placeboit+t+it,
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Pakes [1996] and Combes et  al. [2012] to examine the between and with-
in-counties effect of the demand shock on productivity growth. The evidence 
in Online Appendix Table A.5 rejects the view that reallocation of market 
shares across firms in different counties drives our findings. This result is con-
sistent with the theory we outline below where the within effect is the driver 
of productivity improvements.
Finally, we examine whether our findings are driven by pro-competitive 
effects of changes in demand. We interact the corn dummy with the number 
of firms variable and report the estimates in column 9 of Table VI. Our key 
finding endures.
VI(v). Endogeneity of the EP Act and Ethanol Capacity
One could argue that lobbying affected the timing of the EP Act. It seems 
unlikely that atomistic Midwestern corn farmers lobbied politicians and the 
patterns in contributions to the National Corn Growers Association (the in-
dustry lobby) reported in Online Appendix Figure A.6 are consistent with 
this view. Likewise, Figure A.7 shows that ethanol producers did not lobby 
politicians before 2005. In both cases, contributions are low and flat at 
around $40,000 per annum between 2000 and 2005 but increase thereafter. 
Hence, neither corn nor ethanol producers influenced the timing of the EP 
Act but once in force they were aware of its importance. Figure A.8 also re-
veals that Monsanto, one of the major seed producers, did not increase lob-
bying before 2005. Difference-in-difference estimations reported in Table VII 
also produce no evidence of significant differences in lobbying contributions 
by the treatment and control groups post 2005.25
25 One could argue that the EP Act was undertaken with the goal of raising productivity 
within the corn sector and that our results will be biased as a result. This does not appear plau-
sible for two reasons. First, there is not a single mention of the word ‘corn’ in the EP Act docu-
ments. Second , in unreported Cox Proportional Hazard models we find no significant effect of 
corn yield on time to enactment (failure) during the years 2000 to 2005. That is, corn yields do 
not predict the signing into law of the EP Act. This result holds when we expand the sample to 
include earlier years as well.
table vii   
lobbyinG tests
Pre-2005 Post-2005 Difference
Corn 0.0400 0.1224 0.0824
Wheat 0.1160 0.1185 −0.0025
Difference-in-difference 0.0849
(1.67)
Notes: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
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It is clear from Online Appendix Figure A.9 that ethanol is produced in 
the same areas in which corn is grown, consistent with the importance of 
corn as an input in the production of ethanol. An empirical concern is that 
ethanol plants’ location decisions were based on some pre-treatment trend 
in productivity. For example, the location of ethanol plants could have been 
chosen because of some positive shock to productivity in the pre-EP Act time 
period, or alternatively that ethanol producers strategically targeted sites that 
had large productivity gaps relative to the yield frontier.
The agricultural economics literature suggests this was not the case and 
that the principle determinants of this co-location were shipping costs, the 
effect that competition from other ethanol plants has on local corn prices, 
and proximate markets for the sale of DDG’s as an animal feed (McAloon 
et al. [2000]).26 We conduct a similar exercise using our data period, and test 
the exogeneity of ethanol plant location and capacity expansions with re-
spect to yields within the corn sector. To examine the determinants of entry 
we estimate the equation 
where yct is a 0/1 indicator if  at least one ethanol plant enters county c at 
time t. Similarly, in the capacity expansion regressions yct is a 0/1 indicator if  
there is capacity under construction at an existing ethanol plant in county c 
at time t. Yieldct is the productivity of corn producers in the county; Outputct 
is the natural logarithm of the number of bushels of corn produced in the 
county; DDGct is demand for DDG’s proxied by the number of cattle on 
feed within a 50 mile radius of the county centroid. DDG’s are the principal 
by-product of ethanol production that can be used as a feedstock for farm 
animals. They are an important determinant of ethanol producers’ profit-
ability, accounting for between 15% and 20% of revenues (Hofstrand [2013], 
McAloon et al. [2000], Sarmiento et al. [2012], USDE [2013]). Building on 
current evidence we construct two measures of Competitorsct. First, the num-
ber of other ethanol firms located within a 100 (or 200) mile radius of the 
county; and second, ethanol operating capacity within a 100 (or 200) mile 
radius of the county. These distances are chosen as conservative estimates 
of the radius in which other ethanol plants are likely to have an effect on the 
26 Using data for ethanol plant entry for 2,979 counties over the period 1995 to 2005, Sarmiento 
et al. [2012] provide evidence that the probability of a new ethanol plant locating in a county is 
significantly lower if  that county lies within a 30 mile radius of an existing ethanol plant. By 
60 miles this distance effect is close to zero. They infer from this a strong desire to avoid compe-
tition in procurement of corn. A consequence is that most U.S. counties contain one or no eth-
anol plants. This is consistent with evidence from McNew and Griffith [2005] who show that the 
opening of an ethanol plant significantly increases corn prices only within 150 miles of the plant 
and Fatal and Thurman [2012] who find that local price effects diminish to zero as the distance 
between the county and ethanol plant reaches 103 miles.
(10)
yct = c+1Yieldct−1+2Yieldct−2+3Outputct+4DDGct
+
5
Competitorsct+t+ct,
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location of new ethanol plants found elsewhere in the literature. A full set of 
county c and year t dummies are also included in the model. ct is the error 
term. We estimate Equation (10) using a linear probability model due to the 
inconsistency of fixed-effect probit models.
The results of these tests are provided in Table VIII. There are three key 
 findings, all of which are similar to evidence already found in the literature. 
The behavior of ethanol plants is orthogonal to our measure of productivity 
within the corn sector, yield. This is consistent with the view that we do not 
somehow capture pre-treatment differences in the productivity of corn when 
using the ethanol capacity variable. Instead, strategic profitability motives 
appear to drive location decisions. Consistent with evidence for older plants, 
entrants are significantly more likely to locate in a county that is away from 
existing ethanol plants, or areas with low levels of installed ethanol capacity. 
Entry is also more likely in counties near to DDG markets, although the co-
efficient estimate is only significant at the 10% level.
In regressions 6 to 10 of the table we repeat the exercise but investigate the 
determinants of capacity expansions. Again, we fail to find corn productivity 
or output were determinants of capacity expansion choices. Rather there is 
evidence of a positive link between DDG demand and capacity under con-
struction. The size and location of ethanol plants appear therefore, to be 
unrelated to productivity in the corn sector.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we analyze the link between market size, technology adop-
tion and productivity by exploiting exogenous variation in the demand for 
corn following modifications to U.S. energy policy which triggered a sharp 
increase in ethanol production, a key downstream industry for corn. Using 
difference-in-difference estimations that leverage the fact that wheat is grown 
in close proximity to corn but is not used to manufacture ethanol we find 
robust evidence that increases in demand cause firms to adopt more efficient 
technologies (higher quality genetically modified seeds) leading to productiv-
ity improvements. Economically, we find that the demand shock led physical 
productivity to increase by approximately 7% within the treatment group. 
Triple-difference models show that within the corn industry, the extent of the 
productivity gains following the demand shock were larger in areas with a 
higher incidence of technology adoption.
We also propose a simple model where heterogeneous firms can pay a fixed 
cost to obtain a more sophisticated technology which allows them to produce 
at lower variable costs. The theory suggests that larger demand leads to a higher 
share of firms’ adopting the better technology and, as a consequence, to higher 
aggregate productivity. In the absence of technology adoption an increase in 
firms’ market size generates a reduction in average productivity as larger de-
mand allows less productive firms to survive. Revenue-based productivity can 
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still potentially increase because of a more intense use of any fixed factor, but 
abstracting from technology adoption a larger market does not lead to higher 
physical/technological efficiency. Our results provide new, much needed evi-
dence, and some additional insights on the important role that demand plays 
in motivating technology adoption and productivity improvements.
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